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Banks using either the Foundation or Advanced option of the Internal Ratings
Based approach to credit risk under Basel II must estimate long-run annual average
default probabilities for buckets of homogeneous assets. The one-factor model un-
derlying the capital calculations in Basel II has implications for the distribution of
average (across assets) default rates over time. One of these implications is that the
average default rate in any period is probably smaller than the overall average default
rate (over time and assets). The lesson for practioners is that the short-term default
experience of new, very safe assets is likely to underpredict the true long-run default
rate for these assets.
1 Introduction
The Basel II (B2) capital requirements - see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2006) - are based on a one-factor model due to Gordy (2000) that acommodates system-
atic temporal variation in asset values and hence in default probabilities. This model can
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1be used as the basis of a model that allows temporal variation in the default probabilities,
and hence correlated defaults within years. The value of the ith asset in time t is
vit = 1=2xt + (1   )1=2it
where it is the time and asset specic shock and xt is the common time shock, inducing
correlation  across asset values within a period. The random variables are assumed to
be standard normal and independent. A mean of zero is attainable through translation
without loss of generality since we are only interested in default probabilities. Suppose
default occurs if vit < d; a default threshold value. The overall or marginal default
rate apparently required by B2 is  = (d): However, in each period the default rate
depends on the realization of the systematic factor xt; denote this t: The model implies a
distribution for t: Specically, the distribution of vit conditional on xt is N(1=2xt;1 ):
Hence the period t default probability is
t = [(d   1=2xt)=(1   )1=2]
Thus for  6= 0 there is random variation in the default probability over time. The
distribution is given by
Pr(t  A) = Pr([(d   1=2xt)=(1   )1=2]  A)
= [((1   )1=2 1[A]    1[])=1=2]
using the standard normal distribution of xt and  = (d): This is known as the Va-
sicek distribution. Dierentiating gives the density p(tj;). The parameters are ; the
marginal or long-run mean default probability and the asset correlation : Values for  are
in fact prescribed in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) for dierent asset
classes. There is very little data evidence on  so we defer to the B2 formulas and set 










Figure 1: Densities p t 0.01 for different
the asset correlation. To provide some background, Figure 1 plots the density p(tj;)
for  = 0:01 and  = f0:05;0:1;0:2g:
All of these densities have mean approximately equal to 0.01 but it is clear that the
mass below the mean depends crucially on the correlation :
2 Implications
We claim that default rates annually are more likely to be less than the long run average
than to be above when defaults are correlated. To illustrate the claim, let us use a mid-
portfolio value for the long-run default rate ; say  = 0:01 (100 basis points). With the
asset correlation set at 0.2, the probability that t, a draw from the density p(tj;); is
less than 0.01, the long-run default rate, is 0.709, over two thirds. Thus, we are more than
twice as likely to see a realized default rate in any given year that is below the long-run











Figure 2: Probabilities Pr t for different
is incorrect, the mean of the distribution of t is almost exactly 0.01, the long-run rate.
Rather it is because lower than expected rates, occurring about 71% of the time, are
expected to be 0.0034, or about 1/3 of the long run value, while higher than expected
rates, when they occur, are expected to be 0.026, 2 1/2 times the long-run value.
Having set the stage with an example, we turn to a systematic description of the
relationship between the long-run default rate and the probability that an annual realized
default rate will be below the long-run rate. Figure 2 graphs the probability that the
realization is less than the mean against the mean (long-run rate).
For low values of the default rate, correlation has stronger implications that the ob-
served defaults will be fewer than expected. Thus for very safe highly correlated assets
the realized default rate in a short period is likely to be substantially lower than the true
long-run average default rate. The eect is reversed as the long-run rate crosses 0.5 (not
a relevant default rate, one hopes). The graph is drawn for  = (0:05;0:1;0:2); perhaps
4covering the relevant range of asset correlations. For  = 0 the annual default rate is
equal to the long-run average for any value of the default rate.
3 Conclusion
Average default rates in any year are likely to be less than the long-run average when
defaults are correlated. This fact provides substantial support for the B2 insistence on
data covering a full business cycle for estimating the long-run average default. It raises
special questions for very new assets. Practitioners should be wary of short data sets
especially on new, very safe assets. When default rates are correlated, the default rates
experienced over the rst year or two are likely to substantially underestimate the long-
run average default rate. When the asset correlation is 0.2, a value suggested by B2 when
default rates are near 0.01, the understatement in a year of experience might be by a
factor of 1/3. Perhaps it would be useful to rely on expert judgment about these assets,
at least until adequate data series are observed. See Kiefer (2007). Is this observation
relevant for recent experience with new asset types?
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